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THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE'S
UNDOING OF AN OBLIGATION
DONALD P. ROTHSCHILD*
Under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code,' a party
who is secondarily liable on negotiable paper can be discharged from
his liability on that paper by an act of a holder. An example of such
an act is failure to make necessary presentment or to give notice of
dishonor at the time when the instrument is due.' According to the lan-
guage of section 3-802 (1) (b) of the Code,' such discharge of a second-
arily-liable party from his liability on the instrument will also discharge
him from his liability for the underlying obligation for which the in-
strument was given. The thesis of this article is that such a result may
be both unjust and unnecessary in commercial practice. For example,
consider the case of the indorser of a check who gives that check to a
merchant in payment for goods purchased. He will be discharged (ab-
sent warranty considerations) both from his liability on the check and
his liability to pay for the goods by an unexcused failure of the mer-
chant to either make timely and necessary presentment for payment
or to give notice of dishonor. If the drawer, unknown to either the in-
dorser or the merchant, was insolvent when the check was drawn, is
there any reason why the indorser should be discharged, since he
would not have been able to collect from the drawer upon timely pre-
sentment for payment and notice of dishonor? Should the fact of the
existence of an intermediate indorser affect the answer to this question?
This article explores the ramifications of these thought-provoking
questions. Such an investigation requires an analysis of the liability
of parties on negotiable paper.
I. LIABILITY OF THE PARTIES TO A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT
In essence, the issue relates to the methods of recovery open to
the holder of an indorsement-bearing check other than relief based on
the instrument itself. In other words, it relates to relief based on the
* A.B., University of Michigan, 1950; J.D., University of Toledo, 1965; Fellow
in Law Teaching, Harvard University, 1965-1966.
1 U.C.C. g 3-802:
(I) Unless otherwise agreed where an instrument is taken for an underlying
obligation (a) the obligation is pro tanto discharged if a bank is drawer, maker
or acceptor of the instrument and there is no recourse on the instrument against
the underlying obligor; and (b) in any case the obligation is suspended pro
tanto until the instrument is due or if it is payable on demand until its present-
ment. If the instrument is dishonored action may be maintained on either the
instrument or the obligation; discharge of the underlying obligor on the instru-
ment also discharges him on the obligation.
2 U.C.C. § 3-502(1)(a) (where such failure is without excuse).
3 Supra note 1.
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underlying obligation; in the example above, the obligation arising
from the purchase of goods. In order to consider fully the available
methods of recovery, the reader must draw an initial distinction be-
tween a person's liability as a party to the negotiable instrument, and
his liability arising from the obligation for which the negotiable instru-
ment was given. The former can be considered "liability on the in-
strument," and the latter "liability for the underlying obligation."
Since the Code provides that "discharge of the underlying obligor on
the instrument also discharges him on the obligation,'" it is necessary
to examine first his "liability on the instrument." Then, an examination
of the relationship between the two obligations will reveal the effect
of the section quoted above.
For purposes of this article three types of liability on the instru-
ment will be predicated—primary, intermediate (a term not used by
the draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code) and secondary.
"Primary liability" exists where a party's liability is fixed without the
necessity of satisfying conditions precedent, such as a demand for pay-
ment. The phrase "intermediate liability" is used by this author to
denote that type of liability by which a holder is subject to the opera-
tion of conditions precedent such as presentment for payment and no-
tice of dishonor, but in which failure to observe the conditions precedent
only results in discharging the party to whom the conditions run to
the extent of the latter's injury.' Intermediate liability indicates a "no
harm—no discharge" rule. Thus, although intermediate liability may
be designated under the various provisions of the Code as "primary"
or "secondary" liability, it is used in this article to represent the special
situation of any drawer or acceptor of a draft payable at a bank or
maker of a note payable at a bank when bank insolvency occurs.'
"Secondary liability," on the other hand, exists when failure to observe
conditions precedent results in total discharge of a party from liability
on the instrument. The purpose of using the two latter terms is to draw
into sharp distinction the preferred treatment given to a person sec-
ondarily liable, an indorser, in comparison with one who is inter-
mediately liable, any drawer who maintains funds with the drawee
and is injured by the drawee's insolvency.
A brief analysis of these three types of liability and a number of
comparisons among the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), the
Negotiable Instruments Law (N.I.L.), and the Law Merchant will
illustrate these distinctions. For the purpose of describing the types
of liability, the parties to a negotiable instrument will be considered
4 U.C.C. § 3-802(1) (b).
• U.C.C. § 3-502 (1) (b). The conditions of intermediate liability are !aches, funds
maintained with the drawee and subsequent insolvency, and written assignment.
• U.C.C. § 3-501(1) (b).
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as (1) parties primarily liable, makers of notes and acceptors of
drafts; (2) parties intermediately liable, drawers of checks and drafts;
and (3) parties secondarily liable, indorsers.
A. Primary Liability
1. Makers of Notes
Under the Code, the maker of a note can be discharged only by
payment, cancellation,7
 real defenses, 8 or the running of the statute of
limitations.' Hence, there are no conditions precedent to his liability—
he is "primarily liable."' Accordingly, the maker will not be dis-
charged from his liability on the instrument or his liability for the
underlying obligation for failure of the conditions precedent under the
provisions of section 3-802(1) (b) of the Code. Therefore, further con-
sideration of the maker of a note is unnecessary for purposes of this
article.
The Code engrafts an exception upon the primary liability of the
maker in the case of a bank domiciled note. The maker of a note pay-
able at a bank is only intermediately liable if the payor bank becomes
insolvent during the laches of a holder. Under such circumstances, the
maker may discharge his liability by assigning his rights against the
payor bank in those funds to the holder, but the maker is not other-
wise discharged." Dean Hawkland considers this exception to be just,
for an imposition of the risk of bank insolvency on the obligor "could
seriously impair the use of domicile paper, especially in times of reces-
sion or depression.''• The importance of this exception to section 3-802
(1)(b) is that the maker of a bank domiciled note will be afforded
intermediate liability only when (1) the laches of the holder occurs
during a bank's insolvency, and (2) the maker assigns his claim against
the bank to the holder. Thus, a "no harm—no discharge" rule is
adopted.
2. Acceptors of Drafts
The acceptance of a draft binds the acceptor to primary liability."
After acceptance, the acceptor, like the maker of a note, will not be
7 See U.C.C. § 3-605,
8 See U.C.C. § 3-601.
A cause of action against a maker (acceptor) accrues in the case of a time instru-
ment on the day after maturity, and in the case of a demand instrument upon its date or
if no date is stated, on the date of issue. U.C.C. § 3-122. A cause of action against the
obligor of a demand or time certificate of deposit accrues upon demand, but demand on
a time certificate may not be made until on or after the date of maturity. U.C.C. §
3-122(2).
JO Difficulty may arise in determining who is the maker. See generally Hawkland,
Commercial Paper 29-38 (1959),
11 U.C.C. § 3-502(1) (b). See also U.C.C. § 3-121 as to bank's duty and function.
12 Hawkland, supra note 10, at 26.
13 U.C.C. §§ 3-410(1), -413(1).
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discharged on the instrument for failure to observe conditions prece-
dent. Therefore, aside from possible variations in the statute of limita-
tions, there is no difficulty caused by' questions of whether conduct
by the holder of an instrument will discharge the acceptor on the
underlying obligation.
B. Intermediate Liability
I. Drawers of Checks
The Code provides for situations where necessary presentment or
notice of dishonor is delayed, without excuse, beyond the time when it
is due. In such cases, any drawer of a check payable at a bank (or of
a bank domiciled draft payable at a specified time), who is deprived
of funds he maintained at the bank because it became insolvent during
the delay, may discharge his liability to the holder by written assign-
ment to the holder of his rights to those funds against the bank; but
the drawer (or the acceptor or maker) "is not otherwise discharged.""
(Emphasis added.) Since presentment for payment," notice of dis-
honor and necessary protest" are conditions precedent to the drawer's
liability, his liability is intermediate and he will be discharged only
when he is injured due to bank insolvency. For the Code to become
operative, there must be both an unexcused delay and an intervening in-
solvency.' In establishing the liability of a drawer, presentment of an
uncertified check within thirty days of its date, or the date of issue,
whichever is later, is presumed presentment within a reasonable time."
Consequently, if the check becomes "stale," an unexcused delay will
effect discharge to the extent of injury occasioned by bank insolvency.
Otherwise the "no harm—no discharge" rule applies, and the drawer of
an uncertified check will remain liable on both the instrument and the
underlying obligation."
Section 186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides that "a
check must be presented for payment within a reasonable time after
its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability thereon to the
extent of the loss caused by the delay." The difficulty with this section
is that it is sometimes impossible to determine the precise amount of
the loss caused until after liquidation of the bank. Further, the weight
14 U.C.C.	 3-502(1)(b).
15 A check is a demand instrument, and presentment for acceptance is not ordinarily
necessary. But see 11,C.C. § 3-501 (when instrument requires presentment).
16 This is only "necessary to charge the drawer and indorsers of any draft which on
its face appears to be drawn or payable outside of the states and territories of the
United States and the District of Columbia." U.C.C. § 3-501(3).
17 The provisions concerning waiver or excused presentment, found in U.C.C.
3-511, are presumed inapplicable for purposes of this article.
15 U.C.C. § 3-503(2)(a).
16 See U.C.C. § 4-404 (bank under no obligation to pay after six months).
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of authority interpreting the section places the burden of proof on the
maker or drawer to establish his loss.' The U.C.C. resolves this prob-
lem by use of the assignment procedure,' while the N.I.L. requires
presentment for payment as a condition precedent to charging the
drawer or indorser.' Reasonable time is defined by section 71 of the
N.I.L. as being "within a reasonable time after the last negotiation
thereof," and since the statute "puts no limit on the length of time
that presentment for payment may be delayed provided only that it is
made within a reasonable time after the last negotiation [assuming
timely intermediate negotiations] . .. ," it has engendered no little
difficulty.
Commenting on the obligation of the drawer of a check on the
underlying obligation under the Code, Professor Farnsworth states
that "in UCC 3-802 the usual rule that a check is conditional payment
is restated in more helpful terms of suspension of the underlying obli-
gation.' Although the doctrine of "conditional payment" will be dis-
cussed in some detail hereinafter, it is important to note that he refers
to the provision that the underlying obligation is "pro tanto dis-
charged" until dishonor at which time an action may be maintained on
either the instrument or the underlying obligation. 24 Even though "pro
tanto" is normally used to mean "for so much,"" the Code's draftsmen
appear to be using it to mean that the underlying obligation is merged
with the obligation on the instrument. Thus, where the bank has not
been shown to be insolvent, the drawer of a check is not discharged
from the instrument and is still liable on the underlying obligation as
well.
2. Drawers of Drafts
The rule adopted for drawers of checks applies as well to drawers
of drafts under the Code, which speaks in terms of "any drawer."
(Emphasis added.) Presentment for payment,' notice of dishonor,'
and presentment for acceptance are necessary to charge the drawer.
This last condition is required only where (1) the draft itself so pro-
vides, or (2) it is payable elsewhere than at the drawer's residence or
place of business or (3) the date of payment depends on presentment.'
20 Mars, Inc. v. Chubrilo, 216 Wis. 313, 257 N.W. 157 (1934) (action on account,
defense check payment due to !aches) and cases cited therein.
21 U.C.C. § 3-502(1) (b).
22 N.I.L. § 70. Presentment for acceptance, notice of dishonor and protest may also
be required. N.I.L. § 89.
23 Farnsworth, Negotiable Instruments 55 (1959).
24 U.C.C.	 3-802(1)(b).
25 Black, Law Dictionary 1364 (4th ed. 2951).
26 U.C.C. § 3-501(1)(c).
27 U.C.C. § 3-501(2) (b).
28	 § 3-501(1) (a).
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Failure to give notice of dishonor discharges the drawer' only in a case
where the drawee maintains funds of the drawer and an insolvency
situation ensues, "but such drawer is not otherwise discharged."' Al-
though the Code labels him a "secondary party,"" the drawer has the
status of intermediate liability, since (1) his liability is subject to con-
ditions precedent and (2) he can be discharged only where he has been
injured (assuming there has been compliance with Code provisions).
The significance of this status and its effect on the drawer's liability
for the underlying obligation can be better understood by comparing
the positions of drawers and indorsers under the U.C.C. with their posi-
tions under the N.I.L.
Since the N.I.L. equates primary liability with an absolute obliga-
tion to pay, the drawer of a draft is secondarily liable" because pre-
sentment for acceptance' or presentment for payment 34 is required
to raise such an obligation in him. Difficulties arise, however, when
the courts are faced with functional evaluations of drafts and checks.
Under an older theory, lathes of the creditor discharges the
drawer on both the instrument and the underlying obligation, whether
or not the latter has suffered injury as a result." On the other hand,
the drawer of a check is discharged only to the extent of the loss
caused by the delay." An anomolous situation thus arises: when the
creditor's delay does not amount to lathes, but is merely a negligent
delay in seeking his remedies, and the draft is not accepted, no one is
primarily liable on the instrument. Not only is the drawer discharged
from the instrument, but he is released from the underlying obligation
as well! Accordingly, the drawer of a check is held to greater liability
than the drawer of a draft, i.e., "the drawer of a check is not, in the
fullest sense, a secondary party. Nor is he a primary party . . . [he]
occupies a position intermediate between that of a primary party and
that of a secondary party. 73'
An examination of the functions of a draft indicates that it is used
as a short term credit and collection instrument as well as an instru-
ment used to transmit funds. Unlike the drawer of a check, who may
have criminal sanctions imposed where he does not have funds in the
U.C.C. §§ 3-501(1)(c), (2)(b). But see U.C.C. § 3-511 (notice excused).
36 An assignment of the claim is necessary to effect discharge. U.C.C. § 3-502(1)(b).
31 U.C.C. § 3 -501(1).
32 N.I.L. § 192.
N.I.L. §§ 143-44, 150.
34 N.I.L. § 70 .
35 Cases illustrating this theory are Minehart v. Handlin, 37 Ark. 276 (1881);
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Allen, 11 Mich. 501 (1863); Shipman v. Cook, 16 N.J. Eq. 251 (Ch.
1863); Allan v. Eldred, 50 Wis. 132, 6 N.W. 565 (1880).
86 N.LL. § 186.
37 Britton, Bills & Notes § 199, at 872 (1943).
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drawee bank's possession to cover the check,' a drawer of a draft
does not usually draw "on funds." In a check situation, the holder who
is guilty of laches has no standing to complain when, during his laches,
the drawer, who maintained funds with the drawee, is injured." Even
though the relationship of the drawer of a draft and the drawee is
presumably contractual," the results under the statutes are by no
means consistent. Under the N.I.L., the drawer of a draft can be dis-
charged from the instrument where the holder has failed to observe
conditions precedent to his liability. The Code apparently allows two
results: (1) under certain circumstances, where the drawer of a draft
has funds maintained with a drawee, he can be discharged to the extent
of his injury by the holder's failure to observe conditions precedent;
and (2) conversely, where the drawer has no funds maintained with
a drawee, he cannot be discharged from the instrument. In either case,
however, the minimal liability of the drawer of a draft under the Code
is intermediate since his discharge will be only to the extent of his
injury.
Comparison of a drawer of a draft with an indorser of a note un-
der the Code is worthy of discussion with respect to the distinction
between intermediate and secondary liability. Under the Law Mer-
chant, an indorser was considered a new drawer;," however, his status
changed under the N.I.L. and the Code: 12 Under the N.I.L., both the
drawer of a draft and the indorser of a note are "secondarily liable""
and neither party makes an unconditional promise to pay.' There
are distinctions in the N.I.L. between the secondary liability of the
drawer of a draft and that of an indorser of a note. For example, to
charge the indorser, presentment for payment must be made within
a reasonable time after the last negotiation, but to fix the liability of
the drawer of a draft, it must be within a reasonable time after issue.'
Some courts have simply refused to equate the parties on the basis of
this distinction." The most significant difference between the two par-
ties arises in regard to the liability of each for the underlying obliga-
tion. While the courts have applied the "check rule" to the indorser of
38 Hawkland, supra note 10, at 41.
38 Ibid.
48 Britton, supra note 37, § 199, at 872.
41 Ballingalls v. Gloster, 3 East 481, 102 Eng. Rep. 681 (K.B. 1803).
42 N.LL. § 192; U.C.C. § 3-501(1)(c).
43 N.I.L. § 192.
44 The indorser of a note does not unconditionally promise to pay it, nor does the
drawer of a draft. By negotiating the instrument, the indorser orders the maker to pay
to the bearer or to the order of the indorsee. Similarly the drawer orders the drawee to
pay to the bearer or order of the indorsee.
43 N.I.L. § 71.
48 Winnebago County State Bank v. Hustel, 119 Iowa 115, 93 N.W. 70 (1903)
(no authority in which drawer and payee are treated as synonymous).
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a promissory note and refused to release him on the underlying obliga-
tion unless the laches of the creditor-holder has injured him, laches
of the creditor-holder has released the drawer of a draft on the under-
lying obligation whether or not he has been injured."
The Code has approached this problem through the contractual
liability of the parties. By increasing the drawer's liability on the in-
strument, and allowing discharge to the extent of injury, the Code has
increased his liability on the underlying obligation in cases where no
injury has occurred. Even though the Code holds the drawer of a draft
to a "no harm—no discharge" rule, it has reversed the N.I.L. as to
"any indorser" by allowing discharge from liability on the underlying
obligation upon discharge on the instrument." In other words, the
drawer of a draft will be held to his underlying obligation where he
has not been "deprived of funds" by the drawee's insolvency," but
injury plays no part in the release of the indorser from his underlying
obligation.
C. Secondary Liability
Presentment for payment and notice of dishonor are necessary to
charge a secondary party, any indorser." Where either necessary pre-
sentment or notice of dishonor is delayed without excuse beyond the
time when due, any indorser is discharged on the instrument.' Since
any indorser will be discharged on the instrument if the holder fails
to observe the conditions precedent, his liability is "secondary" by
definition." The Code draws no distinction, other than what constitutes
a reasonable time for presentment," among indorsers of notes, checks
and drafts.
Dean Hawkland suggests" that the liability of a secondary party
47 Where creditor's laches has discharged the drawer on the instrument and
underlying obligation whether or not injury resulted, see cases cited note 35 supra. For
cases holding discharge only where injury (which in the absence of proof is presumed),
see McCrary v. Carrington, 35 Ala. 698 (1860); Smith v. Miller, 52 N.Y. 545 (1873). For
cases holding no release unless injury proven, see Dow v. Cowan, 23 F.2d 646 (8th Cir.
1927); Commercial Inv. Trust v. Lundgren-Wittensten Co., 173 Minn. 83, 216 N.W. 531
(1927).
48 "Where without excuse any necessary presentment . . is delayed beyond the
time when it is due (a) any endorser is discharged Ion the instrument] . . ." U.C.C: §
3-502(1)(a). "[D]ischarge of the underlying obligor on the instrument also discharges
him on the obligation." U.C.C. § 3-802(1) (b).
49 Note that U.C.C. § 3-502, Comment 2 states that "where bank failure or other
insolvency of the drawee or payor has prevented him from receiving the benefit of
funds," the drawer (acceptor or maker) is "deprived of funds." However, this would not
include a situation where the drawer was insolvent.
5° U.C.C. § 3 -501(1) (b).
51
	§ 3-502(1)(a).
52 "Secondary liability	 . exists when failure to observe conditions precedent
results in total discharge. . . ." Supra p. 64.
na U.C.C. § 3-503,
54
 Hawkland, supra note 10, at 39.
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may be predicated on three different theories: (1) on the indorser or
drawer contract, (2) on the warranty contract, and (3) on the under-
lying obligation. For the purpose of this article, the engagement of the
indorser55 and the conditions precedent necessary to charge him with
liability on the instrument are outlined in a footnote," as are the war-
ranties given by the indorser."
Our primary purpose is to consider the liability of a secondary
party based on the underlying obligation. Since, pursuant to section
3-502( 1) (a) of the Code, an unexcused delay of necessary present-
ment will discharge any indorser from his liability on the instrument,
the discharge will also affect his liability on the underlying obligation
under the provisions of section 3-802 (1) (b)." The Code provides in
substance that, in establishing the liability of any secondary party,
presentment of an instrument is due within "a reasonable time after
such party becomes liable thereon." 55 Although it does not precisely
55 Where there is no written disclaimer, every indorser engages to any holder
(whether or not for value) and to subsequent indorsers that he will pay the instrument
according to its tenor at the time of his indorsement where the conditions precedent, i.e.,
presentment for payment, dishonor, necessary notice of dishonor and protest, have been
met. U.C.C. § 3-414(1).
56 Compare U.C.C. §§ 3-501(1)(a), -506, with N.I.L. §§ 143-51 (presentment for
acceptance). Compare U.C.C. §§ 3-501(1) (b), -506, with N.I.L. §§ 70-86 (presentment for
payment). Compare U.C.C. § 3-504(2), with N.I.L. §§ 72-74 (payment) and N.I.L. § 145
(acceptance) as to how presentment is made. Compare U.C.C, § 3-504(4), with N.I.L.
§ 75 (bank domiciled instruments). Compare U.C.C. § 3-505(1)(a)-(d), with N.I.L.
§ 74 (rights of a party to whom presentment is made).
Compare U.C.C. § 3-501(2) (a),(b), with N.I.L. § 89 (necessity of notice of dishonor).
Compare U.C.C. § 3-508, with N.I.L. § 89 (to whom notice is given). Compare U.C.C.
§ 3-508, with N.I.L. §§ 90-92 (by whom notice is given). Compare U.C.C. § 3-508(2),
with N.I.L. §§ 102-04, 107 (definition of when notice is due). Compare U.C.C. §
3-508(3)-(8), with N.I.L. §§ 95, 96 (how notice is given).
Compare U.C.C. § 3-509, with N.I.L, §§ 118, 152-60 (definition of protest). Compare
U.C.C. § 3-501(3), with N.I.L. § 152 (when protest is necessary). Compare U.C.C. § 3-509
(1),(2), with N.I.L. § 153 (how protest is made). Compare U.C.C. § 3-509(1), with N.I.L.
§ 154 (by whom protest is made).
57 This discussion avoids the issue of waiver of conditions precedent. Supra note 17.
However, the appropriate Uniform Commercial Code and Negotiable Instruments Law
sections concerning waiver should be considered prior to discharge. The Negotiable
Instruments Law establishes five types of waiver: (1) "not required," N.I.L. §§ 79-80,
11445; (2) "excused," NIL. §§ 81, 83(2), 113; (3) "dispensed with," N.I.L. §§ 82, 112;
(4) "not necessary," N.I.L. § 116; and (5) "waived," N.I.L. §§ 82(3), 109-11. The
Uniform Commercial Code simplifies this into two categories: (1) "temporarily excused,"
U.C.C. § 3-511(1); and (2) "entirely excused," U.C.C. § 3-511(2). Presentment may be
entirely excused under U.C.C. § 3-511(2)(a) (waived by the party to be charged);
U.C.C. § 3-511(2) (b) (party has dishonored himself); U.C.C. § 3-511(2)(c) (present-
ment cannot be made); U.C.C. § 3-511(3)(a) (death) ; U.C.C. § 3-511(3)(b) (refused
other than for want of proper presentment); U.C.C. § 3-511(4) (prior non-acceptance);
and U.C.C. § 3-511(5) (waiver of protest). Cf. U.C.C. § 3-511(6) (waiver written on
instrument).
58
 "If the instrument is dishonored action may be maintained on either the instru-
ment or the obligation; discharge of the underlying obligor on the instrument also
discharges him on the obligation." U.C.C. § 3-802(1)(b).
as U.C.C. § 3-503(1)(e).
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define "reasonable time," it establishes guide lines such as the nature
of the instrument, and the usages of banking or trade." In the case of
an uncertified check, the presumption is that "reasonable time" in
regard to a drawer is thirty days after its date or the date of issue,
whichever is later;" and in regard to an indorser it is seven days after
his indorsement."
While there is a split of authority under the N.I.L. as to whether
an indorser of a promissory note is discharged on his underlying obli-
gation only to the extent that the laches of his creditor-holder has
injured him, the courts in most states hold that the indorser of a draft
or check is discharged on the underlying obligation by a holder's
laches." In order to ascertain why any indorser should be released not
only on the instrument but on the underlying obligation for which the
instrument was given, it is necessary to examine the relationship be-
tween the two obligations.
In summary, under the Uniform Commercial Code, makers of
notes and acceptors of drafts have primary liability. Therefore, a holder
• would not be precluded from looking to a maker or acceptor on the
instrument should there be a failure to observe the conditions precedent
necessary to charge parties who are "intermediately" or "secondarily"
liable. This eliminates the necessity of considering a maker's or accept-
or's liability on the underlying obligation in this discussion. The drawer
of a check or draft, or the maker of a bank domiciled note, is inter-
60 U.C.C. § 3-503 (2) .
01 U.C.C. § 3-503(2)(a).
62 U.C.C. § 3-503(2)(b).
63
 Where indorser is discharged on the underlying obligation, see McCrary v.
Carrington, supra note 47 (dictum) (third party instrument); Nixon v. Beard, 111
Ind. 137, 12 N.E. 131 (1887) (note taken from pre-existing indebtedness discharges
surety) ; Orange Screen Co. v. Holmes, 103 N.J.L. 560, 138 Atl. 105 (Sup. Ct. 1927)
(indorser discharged for holder's laches); Shipman v. Cook, supra note 35 (indorser
discharged for holder's laches); Dibble v. Richardson, 171 N.Y. 131, 63 N.E. 829 (1902)
(third party instrument taken); Cohen v. Rossmore, 225 App. Div. 300, 233 N.Y.S. 196
(1929) (surety released where not on renewal note); Hall v. Green, 14 Ohio 499 ,
 (1846)
(indorser discharged for laches of holder). For cases holding indorser not discharged on
underlying obligation, see Newell v. Newell, 213 Ind. 261, 12 N.E.2d 344 (1938)
(consideration for pre-existing debt or third party instrument); Bradway v. Groenendyke,
153 Ind. 508, 55 N.E. 434 (1899) (third party note); Droege v. Hoagland State Bank,
86 Ind. App. 236, 156 N.E. 592 (1927) (surety not discharged where renewal note
forged); Beech & Fuller Co. v. Lane, 75 Ind. App. 184, 129 N.E. 52 (1920) (renewal
note); Kimmel v. State, 75 Ind. App, 168, 128 N.E. 708 (1920) (surety not discharged
where note was collateral security); Emerine v. O'Brien, 36 Ohio St. 491 (1881) (surety
not released by forged indorsement on renewal note); City of Philadelphia v. Neil,
211 Pa. 353, 60 Atl. 1033 (1905) (dictum) (third party note); United States v. Hegeman,
204 Pa. 438, 54 Atl. 344 (1903) (renewal note taken); City of Philadelphia v. Stewart,
195 Pa. 309, 45 All. 1056 (1900) (third party note taken); American Nat'l Bank v.
National Fertilizer Co., 125 Tenn. 328, 143 S.W. 597 (1911) (third party note taken but
holder not guilty of laches).
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mediately liable, since, although there are conditions precedent to his
liability which may effect a discharge on the instrument, no discharge
on the underlying obligation will arise unless the drawer is prejudiced.
Accordingly, consideration of the drawer's liability for the underlying
obligation can be limited to those situations where the drawer has been
injured by an act of a holder. Finally, since indorsers, who are sec-
ondarily liable under the Code, can be totally discharged from the
instrument and the underlying obligation as well, it *is necessary to
investigate their relationship to both.
II. RELATIONSHIP OF LIABILITY ON THE INSTRUMENT TO
LIABILITY ON THE UNDERLYING OBLIGATION
The relationship of liability on the instrument to liability for the
underlying obligation is best illustrated by two negotiable instruments
concepts, "conditional payment" and "merger." Where a payment is
termed "conditional," it means, under the common law, that even
though a creditor took a negotiable instrument, the original debt still
existed, and the underlying obligation was not extinguished." Condi-
tional payment is defined by the Code as meaning that "taking the in-
strument is a surrender of the right to sue on the obligation until the in-
strument is due, but if the instrument is not paid on due presentment
the right to sue on the obligation is 'revived.' " 65
The notion underlying the merger doctrine is that an initial obliga-
tion between the parties to a transaction is "merged" with the obli-
gations arising out of a payment by a negotiable instrument from
which new obligations flow. For example, "when a bill or note is
taken for or on account of a debt, the question arises whether it was
taken in absolute discharge of it, and operates as a complete
merger. . . ."" Two types of merger deserve consideration, "absolute
merger" and "partial merger." The former arises when a negotiable
instrument is given for a debt, and the instrument is paid. The latter
arises, using the same example, when a subsequent act by a holder
causes the merger of the instrument and underlying obligation to be
severed. Like so many statements in law, confusion arises not in the
definition, but in its application.
64 Kessler, Levi & Ferguson, Some Aspects of Payment by Negotiable Instrument: A
Comparative Study, 45 Yale L.J. 1373, 1375 (1936).
OS U.C.C. 3-802, Comment 3. However, conditional payment refers to contractual
relations and discharge on the instrument. It does not refer to discharge on the under-
lying obligation which is referred to as "absolute payment," i.e. where a negotiable
instrument is taken for an underlying obligation and the "merger" is permanent, the
negotiable instrument is an absolute payment of the underlying obligation. For discussion
of merger, see pp. 82-85 infra.
08 3 Daniel, Negotiable Instruments § 1447, at 1490 (7th ed. 1933).
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A. The Concept of "Conditional Payment"
The cases treating negotiable instruments as conditional payment
break down into at least five categories: (1) cases attempting to dis-
tinguish between instruments taken as conditional payment from
those taken as collateral security, (2) judicial analysis based on the
intent of the parties, (3) judicial use of presumptions turning on the
type of instrument taken, (4) questions of whether the instrument
was taken for a pre-existing or contemporaneous debt, and (5) ques-
tions of whether the instrument was taken as accord and satisfaction
of a debt.'
1. Instruments as Conditional Payment as Distinguished from Col-
lateral Security
In actions involving promissory notes, a split of authority has
developed on the question of whether an indorser would be released
on the underlying obligation if he were discharged on the promissory
note." Ordinarily, whether the holder took the negotiable paper as
conditional payment or as collateral security for the debt would not
affect the result. However, under one view, the rule was that failure
to present a note for payment and to give notice of dishonor, thereby
discharging an indorser, did not apply to a note given as
notesecurity." For example, where the maker of a promissory t  pledged
the note of another person for a larger amount as collateral security,
and the pledgee failed to demand payment of the note held as col-
lateral, thereby discharging the indorser, the maker could not set up
the discharge as a defense of payment in a suit on the first note."
The basis for this view was that (1) the parties expected the original
debt to be discharged without resort to the collateral, (2) where
collateral was involved, the debtor was expected to make the first move
to discharge the debt, (3) where negotiable paper was given as col-
lateral, the debt would ordinarily mature before the paper, and (4)
collateral paper might be held by the creditor as an ordinary pledge
without indorsement. However, the language used by the courts does
not expressly distinguish collateral security from conditional pay-
ment. 71 The doctrine of collateral security seems to have its roots in the
67 In turn, the five categories will bear analysis by the circumstances of the case,
and the functional use of the particular instrument.
66 See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
69 Coleman v. Lewis, 183 Mass. 485, 67 N.E. 603 (1903), Kane v. Eastman, 288 Pac.
819, 822 (Cal. App. 1930), and 68 L.R.A. 482 n.1 (1905) draw a distinction between
"conditional payment" and "collateral security." Contra, American Nat'l Bank v.
National Fertilizer Co., supra note 63 (no distinction between the two phrases).
79 Coleman v. Lewis, supra note 69. Contra, Jennison v. Parker, 7 Mich. 355, 360
(1859) (creditor makes draft his own by laches).
71 E.g., Morris & Bailey Steel Co. v. Bank of Pittsburgh, 277 Pa. 81, 120 Atl. 698
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historic concept that a bill of exchange was originally used for payment.
Today, however, it is used as a "time instrument" to give the debtor an
extension of time on his obligation, and to place the creditor in a more
liquid position by availing him of the possibility of discounting the
bill." Thus, at common law, the concept of "collateral security" was
grounded on the functional use of a promissory note rather than its use
as a source of funds for payment and, consequently, this concept fell
into disuse when the function of a note was expanded. Under the Code,
variation based upon the type of instrument, i.e., the functional use, is
rejected by implication." But, the holder discharges any party to
the instrument if he unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instru-
ment given by the party, or on his behalf, or by any person against
whom he has a right of recourse."
2. Judicial Analysis of "Conditional Payment" Based on the Intent
of the Parties
The theory that the intent of the parties determines whether a
negotiable instrument is payment fails to simplify the question of
whether an action on the underlying obligation survives an action on
a negotiable instrument." Insofar as evidence is required to show
this intent, the courts vary from a restrictive attitude (the necessity
of an express agreement)," to a liberal one, which admits parol evi-
dence to indicate the circumstances surrounding the transaction."
The liberal view raises the question of whether or not the parol
evidence rule operates against both the plaintiff and defendant
equally.78 Even though "it is elementary that most defenses neces-
sarily rest in parol,"18 it is not so apparent that testimony which
"tends to vary the terms of the instrument," such as evidence that
(1923), aff'd, 283 Pa. 203, 129 Atl. 53 (1925) (check presumed to be collateral security);
City of Philadelphia v. Neill, supra note 63 (notes—even third party—are collateral
security, or at most conditional payment); United States v. Hegeman, supra note 63
(acceptance of new bill from acceptor after maturity for future payment is collateral
security).
72 Kessler, Levi & Ferguson, supra note 64.
73 The Uniform Commercial Code stresses form of negotiable instruments rather
than function. U.C.C.	 3-104, -805.
74 U.C,C. § 3-606(1) (b).
75
 Economy Fuse & Mfg. Co. v. Standard Elec. Mfg. Co., 359 Ill. 504, 194 N.E.
922 (1935) (check indorsed as "accord and satisfaction").
76
 Bell v. McDonald, 308 Ill. 329, 139 N.E. 613 (1923) (holder of promissory note
allegedly procured by fraud).
77
 Feinberg v. Levine, 237 Mass. 185, 129 N.E. 393 (1921) (no evidence that
creditor treated as payment); Gehringer v. Real Estate-Land Title & Trust Co., 321
Pa. 401, 184 Atl. 100 (1936) (circumstances did not indicate contrary intent).
78
 Britton, supra note 37, § 51, at 200-03.
70
 Id. at 201.
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the parties intended conditional as opposed to absolute payment,"
does not violate the rule. The very least that can be said is that
a determination of the "intent of the parties" raises complicated evi-
dentiary problems. To avoid these problems, courts have developed
various presumptions which arise upon the taking of a negotiable
instrument.
"Intent" is retained in the Code as it relates to discharge on the
instrument; for example, the holder may intentionally cancel or
destroy the instrument or may renounce his rights." It should be
noted, however, that these are affirmative acts by the holder requiring
external proof, and are codified into the statute. 82 Manifest intent,
which is adopted by statute, cannot be properly equated to subjective
undisclosed intent, nor is subjective intent a satisfactory basis for
determining whether a negotiable instrument conditionally satisfies
the underlying obligation.
3. Judicial Use of "Presumptions" to Determine Whether a Negoti-
able Instrument is Conditional Payment
Under the Law Merchant, the taking of a negotiable instrument
was "prima facie" evidence of satisfaction of the underlying obligation.
A presumption was raised that the creditor had been paid. 83 Even
where a renewal note was taken, it was held that the holder-creditor
must account for the renewal note before he could recover on the
original note. "Prima fade" evidence of satisfaction of the under-
lying obligation was rebuttable.'
Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, the doctrine of condi-
tional payment developed regarding checks, notes and drafts, and the
courts developed presumptions to favor certain instruments and the
parties thereto.
In the instance of promissory notes, some cases held the presump-
tion to be that claims arising out of the underlying contract were
extinguished by a note—a presumption which could be strengthened
by the parties' course of conducts' Another line of cases has held
that a non-negotiable note did not raise the presumption of payment,"
80 See 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2425 (3d ed. 1940) for definition of parol evidence
rule.
81 U.C.C. § 3 -605.
82 tr.C,C. § 3-605(1)(b).
88
 State v. Adams, 187 Ind. 165, 118 N.E. 680 (1918) (payment by renewal note);
State v. Hullihan, 92 Ind. App. 78, 157 N.E. 282 (1931) (surety defended payment by
note).
84
 State v. Adams, supra note 83.
85 E.g., Duvall v. Ransom & Randolph Co., 90 Ind, App. 605, 169 N.E. 537 (1930)
(promissory notes given in payment of chattels).
80
 Riedman v. Macht, 98 Ind. App. 124, 183 N.E. 807 (1932) (convertor of check
gave a promissory note in payment). Contra, id. at 128, 183 N.E. at 809 (where negotiable
notes).
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or that a debt was not paid by giving a note for a pre-existing indebted-
ness." The conflicting use of presumptions is illustrated by the fact
that in Indiana an appellate court held a promissory note gave rise
to the presumption of payment" while in New York, at approximately
the same time, it was held that a strong presumption arises that
the parties did not intend the debt to be extinguished by promissory
notes."
In cases involving payment by check, the weight of authority
is that a check does not raise the presumption of payment; it is
merely conditional payment.°° Yet, under the N.I.L., decisions are
by no means uniform. Other factors are considered significant, such as
whether certification was requested by the holder-creditor," whether
the creditor was guilty of laches,' whether the debtor was primarily
or secondarily liable on the instrument" and whether the instrument
was that of a third party."
The lack of uniformity in presumptions raised is indicated by
the New Jersey annotation to section 3-802 of the Code: "these rules
impress one as inconsistent and haphazard.' This comment refers
specifically to the presumption of payment arising where a third party
instrument is given concurrently with the creation of a debt. The
annotator describes this presumption as being continued under section
3-802(1) of the Code, and states, "that no good reason [exists] to
presume the parties presumptively have agreed to take the instrument
in discharge of the obligation . . . unless the underlying obligor is
not liable on the third party instrument," if he, for instance, transfers
the bill or note without indorsing it. Although presumptions are useful
in ascertaining court policy, they do not effectively serve to indicate
the basis for this policy.
87 Newhall v. Arnett, 279 Pa. 317, 123 Atl. 819 (1924) (suit against accommodation
maker of note).
88 Duvall v. Ransom & Randolph Co., supra note 85.
Bo Sedwitz v. Arnold, 164 Misc. 892, 299 N.Y.S. 848 (City Ct. 1937) (acceptance of
promissory note in payment of antecedent debt).
9° Tuckel v. Jurovaty, 141 Conn. 649, 109 A.2d 262 (1954) (third party check);
Baughman v. Lowe, 41 Ind. App. 1, 83 N.E. 255 (1908) (client accepted attorney's
check); Nason v. Fowler, 70 N.H. 291, 47 Atl. 263 (1900) (tax collector accepted check).
pi See generally 14 Wyo. L.J. 39 (1959).
92 Danks v. Kropp Steel Co., 21 Ill. App. 2d 252, 157 N.E.2d 694 (1959) (creditor
must return check offered as accord and satisfaction); Cochrane v. Zahos, 286 Mass. 173,
189 N.E. 831 (1934) (laches will effect discharge on postdated check).
93 Tuckel v.•Jurovaty, supra note 90 (fact that debtor was indorser does not alter
liability); Carroll v. Sweet, 128 N.Y. 19, 27 N.E. 763 (1891) (if debtor secondarily liable,
failure of conditions precedent discharge him).
94 Contra, ibid (fact that instrument is that of third party does not alter result).
See Cox v. Hayes, 18 Ind. App. 220, 47 N.E. 844 (1897); Fleig v. Sleet, 43 Ohio St. 53, 1
N.E. 24 (1885); Wendkos v. Scranton Life Ins. Co., 340 Pa. 550, 17 A.2d 895 (1941).
95 N.J. Rev. Stat. § 12A; 3-802 (1962).
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4. Instruments Taken for Pre-existing as Opposed to Contempora-
neous Debts
Another factor in determing whether a payment was "conditional"
at common law was whether the instrument was given in satisfaction
of a pre-existing or contemporaneous debt. "It is a general principle
of law that one simply, [sic] executory' contract does not extinguish
another for which it is substituted, and negotiable securities form
no exception."" An expression of this statement can be found as
early as 1694 in Clerke v. Mundall,97 where Lord Holt said, "a bill
shall never go in discharge of a precedent debt, except it be part of
the contract that it shall be so."" An English statute," passed ten
years later, provided that where a bill was taken for a former debt
it was complete payment of the debt. Clerke seems to turn on a ques-
tion of fact, that the creditor took the bill of exchange from his debtor
who was an indorser on the bill, and the creditor had a reasonable
time to accept or reject it. The status of the parties, rather than the
fact that the bill was consideration for a pre-existing debt, is signifi-
cant. The now-almost-forgotten statute took as its basis the functional
aspect of the instrument.
There is case law, however, supporting the proposition that where
a creditor takes a note for a pre-existing debt it is absolute, not condi-
tional, payment.'" Courts have fallen into pitfalls by using this
distinction as a basis for determining liability on the underlying obliga-
tion. In Keller v. North Am. Life Ins. Co.,'" the plaintiff-bene-
ficiary of a life insurance policy which was canceled brought an action
to recover the cash value prior to cancellation. The defendant insurer
contended that since the payment had been made partly in cash and
partly by a note which was unpaid, the balance of the unpaid note
should be deducted from the cash value. The trial court's holding
for the defendant was reversed because the note was held to have
been given in consideration of a pre-existing debt and, therefore, was
06 Daniel, supra note 66, § 1448, at 1491.
97 Although the case is widely cited for the proposition that a note does not
discharge a pre-existing debt, it turned on the issue that the creditor had a reasonable time
to accept or reject the note as payment which was a question of fact. Clerke v. Mundall,
12 Mod. 203, 88 Eng. Rep. 1263 (K.B. 1694).
98
 Ibid.
99
 An Act for Giving Like Remedy on Promissory Notes as is now used upon Bills
of Exchange and for the Better Payment of Inland Bills of Exchange, 3 & 4 Anne, c.9,
§ 7 (1704).
100
 Nixon v. Beard, supra note 63 (surety executed note). Contra, Dow v. Cowan,
23 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1927) (check in payment of promissory note); Mellencamp v.
Reeves Auto Co., 100 Ind. App. 26, 190 N.E. 618 (1934) (conditional seller accepted
renewal note on obligation); Sedwitz v. Arnold, supra note 89 (creditor accepted
promissory note); Jagger Iron Co. v. Walker, 76 N.Y. 521 (1879) (renewal notes
accepted); Merrick v. Boury, 4 Ohio St. 60 (1854) (note altered by creditor).
101
 Keller v. North Am. Life Ins. Co., 301 III. 198, 133 NE. 726 (1921).
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not the equivalent of a payment, thus resulting in a complete forfei-
ture! Suretyship cases are rife with such logic. In Droege v. Hoagland
State Bank,142
 the maker's father had signed as surety on an earlier
note, and his signathre was forged on a subsequent renewal note.
The bank-payee of notes given in payment of the earlier note sued
the father, who defended on grounds of release. The court held that
a good faith acceptance of a renewal note on which the signature of
the surety has been forged from the principal does not operate as pay-
ment of the original note so as to extinguish the payee's right of
action thereon despite the negligence of the payee.' It should be
clear from this discusion that a hard and fast rule dealing with pre-
existing indebtedness is at best another subdivision of judicial
presumptions which will not lend consistency to the law.
5. Negotiable Instruments as an "Accord and Satisfaction" of Under-
lying Obligations
One can also find language in some cases indicating that the
factor of whether a negotiable instrument was given for a liquidated
or unliquidated debt (accord and satisfaction) is significant in deter-
mining liability on the underlying obligation. For example, in Neher
v. Kerr, 104 a creditor sued a debtor on account. The debtor defended
that the debt was unliquidated and that the creditor had accepted a
negotiable instrument in a lesser amount. The court held that where
a bona fide dispute exists as to the amount due, and the creditor
accepts a negotiable instrument in full payment, the account is
discharged; the payment is not conditional. In the landmark case of
Fleig v. Sleet, 1" the plaintiff-vendor brought an action on account
and the defendant, an indorser of a third party check which was sub-
sequently dishonored, defended that there was an accord and satisfac-
tion. The court held that, although there was an accord as to the
amount of the unliquidated account, the delivery of a worthless check
was not satisfaction. The court added in obiter dictum that had delay
of presentment caused prejudice, a different question could have arisen.
Other cases indicate that where a negotiable instrument is given as
an accord and satisfaction, the creditor must accept it as such,"
102
 Droege v. Hoagland State Bank, supra note 63.
103 Compare Emerine v. O'Brien, supra note 63 (forged note does not operate as
satisfaction of antecedent debt) with Droege v. Hoagland State Bank, supra note 63. Cf,
State v. Adams, supra note 83 (surety not released by renewal notes); Knight v.
Kerfoot, 184 Ind. 31, 110 N.E. 206 (1915) (surety released by renewal notes which she
did not sign) ; Kirchstein v. Dreazen, 128 Misc. 686, 219 N.Y.S. 697 (Munic. Ct. 1927)
(surety released by varying terms).
104 Neher v. Kerr, 70 Ind. App. 363, 123 N.E. 467 (1919).
103 Fleig v. Sleet, supra note 94.
106 Federal Cas. Co. v. Chatman, 69 Ind. App. 67, 121 N.E. 296 (1918) (insurer's
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or the instrument must explicitly state the compromise' or there
must at least be a mutual agreement.'" One recent case held that a
duty arises on the part of the creditor to accept or specifically reject
the instrument.'"
Even though payment by negotiable instrument is an affirma-
tive defense with the burden of proof on the party asserting it," °
the pleading may raise the issue of discharge on the underlying obli-
gation arising from an accord and satisfaction. Prior to Supplement
No. 1 to the 1952 Official Text, section 3-802(3) provided:
Where a check or similar payment instrument provides that
it is in full satisfaction of an obligation the payee discharges
the underlying obligation by obtaining payment of the instru-
ment unless he establishes that the original obligor has taken
unconscionable advantage in the circumstances.
This subsection was in accord with the weight of authority when
a debt was unliquidated;" however, when the debt was liquidated,
it effected a substantial change. 112
 Even though the effect of the
Code rule was modified by the statement that the underlying debt
was not discharged where the payee "establishes that the original
obligor has taken unconscionable advantage in the circumstances,"
no authority directly bearing on unconscionability was noted."' As
a result of the deletion of this section, it is doubtful that an underlying
obligor would be released from a liquidated debt by discharge on an
instrument marked "in full payment," but for a sum less than the
full amount of the stated account. For example, A owes store B twenty
dollars and indorses a third party check for ten dollars as "payment in
full." When the check is dishonored, A is discharged for late present-
ment. Query, is A discharged on his twenty dollar account?' The
answer is not clear, but, at any rate, the current provisions of the Code
do not adopt the rule contained in section 3-802(3).
check issued in compromise of claim). Accord, Economy Fuse & Mfg. Co. v. Standard
Elec. Mfg. Co., supra note 75 (check indorsed as "payment in full").
107 Talbott v. English, 156 hid. 299, 59 N.E. 857 (1901) (check indorsed "rent").
108 Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Canan, 195 Pa. 589, 46 AtI. 115 (1900)
(evidence adduced that creditor did not notice check marked "full payment").
109 Danks v. Kropp Steel Co., supra note 92; Federal Cas. Co. v. Chatman, supra
note 106 (check must be accepted). Contra, Economy Fuse & Mfg. Co. v. Standard
Elec. Mfg. Co., supra note 75 (no obligation to return). See East Coast Dry Goods Co.
v. Somerset Sportswear, Inc., 151 So. 2d 68 (Fla. App. 1963) (evidence of restrictive
indorsement not sufficient to substantiate accord and satisfaction).
110 Ibid. See Murray, Negotiable Instruments, 18 U. Miami L. Rev. 416, 425 (1963).
111
 2 N.Y.L. Revision Comm., Study of the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 3—
Commercial Paper 446 (1955).
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114
 See Okla. Stat. Ann. 12A § 3-802 (1963). See also U.C.C. § 2-209, Comment 2
(test of good faith).
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Insofar as "conditional payment" affects the obligor's liability on
the underlying obligation, the following observations may be made:
(1) The initial concept of collateral security arose when a
promissory note was used primarily as a means of payment and,
therefore, discharge of an indorser from his liability for the underlying
obligation due to the laches of the holder might not occur when the
note was taken as "collateral security. 11 ' 5 Consideration of the
obligor's liability on the underlying obligation should be balanced
by the realization of the expanded use of promissory notes, and by the
consideration that the courts have never clearly defined this concept.
(2) Intent of the parties, if used as a subjective standard, flaunts
the purpose of the Code as found in section 1-102 "to simplify, clarify
and modernize the law governing commercial transactions . . . [and]
to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions." Addition-
ally, objective manifestations of "intent" have been codified in the
Code.' 15
(3) The use of presumptions to explain conditional payment
has been shown to be inconsistent and haphazard, and adds little to
uniformity.
(4) Whether a negotiable instrument is held as consideration
for a pre-existing or contemporaneous debt does little to indicate the
expectations of the parties, and is but another form of presumption.
(5) Finally, the use of accord and satisfaction as a device to
determine the liability of the underlying obligor appears to have been
rejected by the Commissioners and, if in conflict, would be rejected
by the courts.
Conditional payment fails to provide a satisfactory basis. for dis-
charge on the underlying obligation, and fails to provide a reliable
method for resolving the conflicting expectations of the parties. For ex-
ample, it is not clear why a payee-indorser who takes from the insolvent
drawer, should be released for failure of timely presentment when it
is assumed that timely presentment would not enable him to collect
from the drawer. Yet, the decisional law that has developed under
the doctrine of conditional payment would prescribe this result whether
or not the indorser was injured by the delay in presentment.'' "Condi-
tional payment" only seems to be a method of categorizing those
conditions under which the effect of taking a negotiable instrument
is to merge the underlying obligation with the liabilities arising from
the instrument itself. For this reason, the concept of "merger" merits
further consideration.
1115 See text accompanying note 70 supra.
116 U.C.C. § 3-605(1).
tiT Accord, supra note 47 (cases concerning drawers who are discharged without
injury or injury presumed; the same conditions are true for indorsers).
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B. The Doctrine of Merger
"Merger" exists when the relationship of "liability on the instru-
ment" and "liability for the underlying obligation" are identical.
Where a negotiable instrument is taken for an underlying obligation
and the merger is permanent, the negotiable instrument is an absolute
payment of the underlying obligation. This transaction is commonly
called absolute payment. Where there is a "partial merger," a "pro
tanto" discharge of the underlying obligation, the original debt still
remains, but the remedy is merged "on the instrument till the
maturity of the instrument in the hands of the creditors."" B Where
a partial merger (hereinafter referred to as a "pro tanto discharge")
occurs, action on the underlying obligation is proscribed and the holder
must look to his remedies on the instrument against parties who may
be primarily, intermediately, or secondarily liable. The holder-creditor
may always look to the party who is primarily liable on the instrument
without the necessity of observing conditions precedent. The holder-
creditor, however, must observe the conditions precedent to fix the
liability of parties who are intermediately or secondarily liable. In
the case of parties who are intermediately liable, failure of the holder
to observe the conditions will discharge the intermediate party only
to the extent that the failure has injured that party.'" A party who
is secondarily liable may be completely discharged on the instrument
by such failure. When the underlying obligation is merged, perma-
nently or partially, in the instrument and the party who is secondarily
liable is discharged from his contractual obligations on the instrument,
he is also discharged, permanently or partially, on the underlying ob-
ligation.. If, arguendo, a party who is secondarily liable should not be
discharged from the underlying obligation, the fault must lie with the
doctrine of merger, the status of the party (secondary liability), or
his contractual obligations. "Merger" will be examined as it existed
under the early theory of "absolute payment" (absolute merger),
the later theory of "pro tanto discharge" (partial merger), and the
effect thereon of laches.
1. The Property Concept of a Negotiable Instrument: Quid Pro Quo
The taking of a negotiable instrument in satisfaction of an
underlying obligation involved the idea of quid pro quo, in that the
merchant understood the value of what he was receiving to be the
satisfactory equivalent of the debt, is a fundamental notion of "abso-
lute payment." Certification of a check procured by the holder is held
to be the equivalent of payment, and discharges the drawer and prior
Byles, Bills, Notes & Checks 4 554 (3d ed. 1928).
110 U.C.C. 11 3-502.
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indorsers on the underlying obligation.' Originally, when a creditor
accepted a third party instrument for a debt contracted contemporane-
ously with the acceptance, a presumption arose that the creditor took
the instrument in absolute payment.' The change in the functional
concept of a bill of exchange has already been noted. 122 This resulted
in holdings that the fact that instruments were third party did not
effect liability on the underlying obligation.'"
The Code adopts the position that where a holder procures certi-
fication of a check, the drawer and all prior indorsers are discharged.'"
Moreover, although the language of N.I.L. section 119 indicates that
the instrument itself could be discharged, it left uncertainties as to
the effect of a discharge upon subsequent holders in due course.'"
The Code speaks of discharge of the parties indicating a shift away
from the common law notion of a negotiable instrument as property.'"
2. Pro Tanto Discharge
Justice Travis, dissenting from a decision of the Indiana Supreme
Court holding that a note was merely conditional payment, affirmed the
rationale of an earlier opinion that "it is necessary to commercial
transactions that the rules of liability of parties to negotiable paper
should be fixed and certain," because it is better that rules be arbitrary
than that they lack precision.'" This policy is reflected in early cases
which hold payment is an absolute release. In an early Ohio case, the
court held that where one note is given in renewal of another, the
former is regarded as merged in and discharged by the other.'" The
120 E.g., Karvalsky v. Becker, 217 Ind. 524, 29 N.E.2d 560 (1940); Nardine v.
Kraft Cheese Co., 114 Ind. App. 399, 52 N.E.2d 634 (1944); Kinder v. Fishers Nat'l
Bank, 93 Ind. App. 213, 177 N.E. 904 (1931). Cf. Born v. Lafayette Auto Co., 196 Ind.
399, 145 N.E. 833 (1924) (where drawer procures certification).
121 Dibble v. Richardson, 171 N.Y. 131, 63 N.E. 829 (1902). But see Orange Screen
Co. v. Holmes, 103 N.J.L. 560, 138 Atl. 105 (Sup. Ct. 1927) (third party instrument only
pro tanto discharge). Accord, Bradway v. Groenendyke, 153 Ind. 508, 55 N.E. 434
(1899) (no express agreement as to effect of note). See also Newell v. Newell, 213 Ind.
261, 12 N.E.2d 344 (1938) (third party instrument must be shown to be payment by
preponderance).
122 A bill of exchange was originally used as a form of payment, but now is
considered a time instrument. For a discussion of the purposes of notes, see Riedman v.
Macht, supra note 86.
123 Wendkos v. Scranton Life Ins. Co., supra note 94 (third party check given in
payment of insurance premium); City of Philadelphia v. Neill, 211 Pa. 353, 60 Att.
1033 (1905) (dictum) (third party note is not absolute payment).
124 U.C.C.	 3 -411(1).
123 U.C.C. § 3-601, Comment 2.
126
 Ibid.
127 Born v. Lafayette Auto Co., Supra Note 120, at 411-21, 145 N.E. at 837-40
(dissent).
128
 Bank of Cadiz v. Slemmons, 34 Ohio St. 142 (1877) (dictum) (new notes
delivered on settled amount).
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landmark case of Shipman v. Cook' stood for the proposition that
delivery of a bill or note is not payment of a precedent debt, but
merely suspends the remedy. In Visnov v. Levy,' frequently cited in
annotations to section 3-802 (1) (b), the court announced the law under
the Uniform Commercial Code to be that payment by check effects
a pro tanto suspension of the debt."' Temporary suspension of the
remedy on the underlying obligation avoids multiplicity of suits by
first requiring an action for liability arising from the instrument
itself.'" Since the contractual liabilities of the parties are fixed by
statute, "uniform law among the various jurisdictions' can be
accomplished. Thus, pro tanto discharge has been adopted by the
Code to accomplish uniformity and avoid multiplicity of actions. But
since, under the Code, the acts of a holder can effect discharge, pro
tanto discharge can become absolute where the party to be charged
has been injured by the holder's laches.
3. Laches of the Holder
In Orange Screen Co. v. Holmes,'" the court stated that the rule
of pro tanto discharge applied, but went on to say that where a third
party note was taken, "if the holder be guilty of laches, it operates as
a complete satisfaction." 145 The "no harm—no discharge" rule devel-
oped from this early concept: if a bill is received as conditional pay-
ment, failure to observe conditions precedent neither compels the
obligee to take the instrument as absolute payment nor deprives him
of an action on the original debt where the failure does not cause
injury to the drawer.'" If, however, a check is not presented within a
reasonable time, and the drawer suffers a loss, be is discharged on
the instrument and from the underlying obligation to the extent of
the loss caused by the delay."'
129 Shipman v. Cook, 16 N.J. Eq. 251 (Ch. 1863) (third party note indorsed in
part payment of mortgage debt),
13° Visnov v. Levy, 2 Pa. D. & C.2d 686 (Phila. 1955).
131
 Id. at 688. See McCrary v. Carrington, 35 Ala. 698 (1860); Phoenix Inc. Co. v.
Allen, II Mich. 501 (1863); Hoar v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 118 App. Div. 416, 103
N.Y.S. 1059 (1907) in regard to pro tanto discharge.
132
 Sutton v. Baldwin, 146 Ind. 361, 45 N.E. 518 (1896) ,(creditor accepted check).
133 U.C.C. § 1-102.
134 Orange Screen Co. v. Holmes, supra note 121.
135
 Id. at 561, 138 Atl. at 105. See also Shipman v. Cook, supra note 129; Hall v.
Green, 14 Ohio 499 (1846) Caches of holder released indorser of note). For cases
holding that laches of holder released drawer, see Commercial Inv. Trust v, Lundgren-
Wittensten Co., 173 Minn. 83, 216 N.W. 531 (1927) ; Smith v. Miller, 52 N.Y. 545
(1873). Cf. Minehart v. Hancifin, 37 Ark. 276 (1881) (drawer of draft discharged by
failure of condition precedent without injury).
133
 Carroll v. Sweet, supra note 93.
137 Gordon v. Levine, 194 Mass. 418, 80 N.E. 505 (1907).
138 Cochrane v. Zahos, supra note 92.
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In summary, although the doctrine of absolute merger has not
been adopted by the Code, other than where a holder procures certi-
fication of a check, the doctrine of pro tanto discharge (partial merger)
of the underlying obligation is expressly adopted."° Unlike conditional
payment which looks to such factors as collateral security, intent of
parties, presumptions, pre-existing indebtedness and accord and
satisfaction, all of which have resulted in conflicting precedent, pro
tanto discharge looks to the liability of the parties to a negotiable in-
strument. The Code's concept of commercial paper and the requisites
of negotiability concern form alone and presuppose a unitary concept
of commercial paper. Pro tanto discharge conforms to this unitary
concept by looking first to the liability of the parties on the instrument,
and then to their liability on the underlying obligation. It is for this
reason that section 3-802 of the Code adopts the doctrine of pro tanto
discharge. Consequently, the doctrine is appropriate in analysing the
relationship of liability on the instrument with liability for the under-
lying obligation. Such analysis, however, fails to answer the question
why the Code adopts the doctrine of pro tanto discharge in the case
of those parties intermediately liable, drawers of drafts and checks,
and apparently rejects it for parties who are secondarily liable, in-
dorsers. To answer this question, it is necessary to look to the statute
itself.
III. THE PRACTICAL OPERATION OF SECTION 3-802(1) (b)
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
A. Two Hypothetical Problems
Consider how the following hypothetical check payment situa-
tions would be resolved under the Code.
(1) A, a good customer of B, presented a personal check
drawn by D, whom B did not know, and who was totally
insolvent when the check was drawn. The check was
drawn on a local bank made payable to A, and specially
indorsed by A to B in payment for goods. B, without
excuse, misplaced the check for three weeks. When B
presented the check for payment,'" it was dishonored
by the drawee bank. A refused to make the check good.
Or,
(2) B took the check given to him by A, the first indorser,
and specially indorsed it the same day to his supplier,
C, in payment of an invoice. C, without excuse, mis-
placed the check for three weeks. On presentment for
139 U.C.C. § 3 -802(1).
140 U.C.C. § 3-501(1)(b).
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payment, the drawee bank dishonored the check, where-
upon B refused to make the check good."'
From what has been stated thus far, A in the first hypothetical, and
A and B in the second would be released as indorsers on the check
because of the unexcused failure to present the check for payment
within a reasonable period of time. 142 Furthermore, these parties would
also be discharged on their underlying obligation because section
3-802 (1) (b) provides ". . . discharge of the underlying obligor on
the instrument also discharges him on the obligation." (Emphasis
added.)
The official comment to this section states that a check or other
negotiable instrument is "conditional payment," i.e. ". . . taking the
instrument is surrender of the right to sue on the obligation until
the instrument is due; but if the instrument is not paid on due pre-
sentment, the right to sue on the obligation is 'revived."145 This
definition of conditional payment more closely follows the definition of
pro tanto discharge, and since discharge of the underlying obligor on the
instrument also discharges him on the obligation, the statute has
the effect of absolute payment."'
The comment does little to answer the issue posed in the hypothet-
icals as to why the indorser of a check has a preferred position. The
Code makes the rule (discharge of the indorser as opposed to discharge
of the drawer) turn on the meaningless distinction between a drawer
and indorser, and not on primary and secondary liability."' The con-
fusion caused by this distinction is indicated by the comment of the
New York Law Revision Commission"' that "it is not clear . . . the
obligor on an underlying obligation would be discharged on that obli-
gation by a discharge of his liability on the instrument resulting from
a failure of timely presentment or notice of dishonor." Research in
the other state comments to this section has not proved fruitful in
141
 For the purpose of this article it is assumed that the delay in presentment for
payment does not result in waiver or excuse (neither A nor B knew that the drawer
was insolvent) ; and, therefore, the provisions of U.C.C. 3-417(2) are not applicable.
142 "Where without excuse any necessary presentment or notice of dishonor is
delayed beyond the time when it is due (a) any indorser is discharged. . . ." U.C.C.
3-502(1)(a). Presentment for payment must be within a reasonable time after the
indorser's indorsement to hold him liable, which is presumed to be seven days after
his indorsement. U.C.C. §§ 3-503(1) (e), (2) (b).
148
 U.C.C. § 3-802(1) (b), Comment 3.
144
 "Absolute payment" (merger) involves those situations in which the taking of a
negotiable instrument "merged" the underlying obligor's debt into the instrument, thus
making the instrument "absolute payment" of the debt.
148
 N.J. Rev. Stat.
	 12A: 3-802 (1962), comments that this distinction "does not
impress the writer as being an improvement."
14e 2 N.Y.L. Rev. Comm. Study of the U.C.C. 445 (1955).
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resolving the issue raised by the first hypothetical, 147 nor does an
investigation of the official comments as to the reason for discharge
of an indorser due to the failure of timely presentment. Section 3-503,
Comment 3 of the Code indicates the policy behind discharge of the
indorser to be that "the indorser who has normally received the check
and passed it on, and does not expect to have to pay it, is entitled to
know more promptly whether it is to be dishonored, in order that he
may have recourse against the person with whom he has dealt."
(Emphasis added.) This comment begs the question. Even admitting
that the indorser does not expect to pay the check, it does not follow
that he expects to escape liability for the underlying obligation. Further-
more, an assumption that the indorser is entitled to prompt presentment
so that he can have recourse against a prior party only acknowledges
that where he is deprived of that recourse and is injured thereby, he is
entitled to discharge. This does not mean that the indorser should be
released on the instrument and from the underlying obligation when
he is not injured by the failure of timely presentment as in the case of
the hypothetical problem. As a matter of fact, the indorser probably
expects that if the instrument fails, he will have to pay for the under-
lying obligation!
B. Alternatives and Evaluation
Since the relationship of "liability on the instrument" and "liabil-
ity for the underlying obligation" is not satisfactorily resolved by
section 3-802 (1) (b), an examination of alternatives is in order. The
hypothetical problems serve as a useful method of analysing and evalu-
ating such alternatives.
1. The First Hypothetical Problem
In the first fact pattern there seems to be no just reason why
Indorser A should be discharged from the instrument and his under-
lying obligation. Even though A had the right to know promptly that
the check was dishonored, the notice would not have enabled him to
147
 E.g., Cal. Commercial Code § 3802, Comment 4:
Subparagraph (1)(b) provides that upon maturity of the instrument an
action may be maintained either on the debt or upon the instrument at the
option of the holder. Assuming an irrevocable election is contemplated, and this
is inferred in the comment following the section, it might be desirable to use
more explicit language to indicate precisely when and how such an election
is made;
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 19 -3 -802 (1964), Comment:
Negotiable instruments frequently are given and received for an underlying
negotiable or non-negotiable obligation. Rules for determining when the under-
lying obligation is discharged or suspended are stated by this section. . . • The
rules stated by this section are subject to contrary agreements which may be
important. to show either that a conditional discharge is unconditional or that
a pro tanto discharge is intended to serve as a total discharge.
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collect from Drawer D because D was assumed to be judgment proof.
Moreover, as a practical matter, A would no more expect to have a
worthless check "pay" for the goods purchased than he would a
counterfeit bill! The notion of discharge from the underlying obliga-
tion of the indorser does not correlate with commercial understandings.
In commercial practice a check is used for the "payment" func-
tion, and parties to the instrument should be held to its commercial
usage. The fact that by custom and usage an indorser seldom dates
his indorsement is indicative that timely presentment is not the reason
for the indorsement. The indorser uses the instrument to satisfy an
underlying obligation, and understands that payment of the instrument
will discharge the underlying obligation.
The equitable solution to the problem, therefore, is not to dis-
charge A from the underlying obligation since it was he who took
the check from D and not B (the seller-indorsee). One satifactory
method of accomplishing this, which has already been indicated, is
based solely on an "effect test": to change the contractual liability of
the indorser from that of secondary liability, by which he would be
afforded complete discharge on the instrument, to intermediate liability
where his discharge would only be to the extent of the injury caused
by the delay in presentment for payment by the holder. Even a cursory
examination of the pertinent Code sections' indicates the redrafting
implications. Beyond this impediment, the ramifications of such a
change in the law in those states which have not adopted the Code
are enormous. This is by no means intended as a statement that
such a change of the contractual liability of the indorsers is not
desirable; however, such a change could not be substantiated by this
article.
Under the first hypothetical, a drastic revision of contractual
liability is unnecessary since the alternative remedy of an amendment
to. section 3-802 (1) (b) could accomplish the result of not releasing
A on his underlying obligation, even if he is released on the instrument.
The condition for discharge on the underlying obligation could be
stated to be "to the extent of injury due to the laches of the holder." 149
2. The Second Hypothetical Problem
A clear distinction should be drawn between the two problems
145 Sections illustrating the problem's dimensions are U.C.C. §1 3-414, -417, -501 to
-503, -601.
140
 U.C.C. § 3-502, Comment 2 notes the difficulty caused by the language "to the
extent of the loss caused by the delay." The comment refers to a bank insolvency
situation which does not seem to be as commercially significant today as the discharge
of an indorser from the instrument.
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presented. In the first situation three parties are involved, D (the
drawer of the check), A (the payee-indorser), and B (the holder),
while in the second, the check has been negotiated an additional time
so that B becomes a subsequent indorser, and C becomes the holder.
The critical distinction is that of the contractual obligations between
C and A, the payee-indorser, since they are not in privity with each
other.
Under the additional facts in the second problem, the "expectation
argument" breaks down. Even though A would not have been able to
collect from D in the first example, had there been timely presentment,
the same cannot be said of B's rights against A in the second example.
As a matter of fact, assuming a timely presentment by C, A would
be liable to subsequent indorsers and holders."° Thus by C not pre-
senting the check for three weeks, B's procedural rights against A on
the instrument have been adversely affected. Looking to commercial
practice again, there is nothing to indicate the necessity of extending
the liability of any indorser past the warranty extension now provided
under section 3-417(2); because the concept of negotiability by
indorsement might be impaired should the indorser be required to
give up his rights against his transferor, and yet be liable against a
subsequent transferee.
The strongest argument in favor of changing the contractual
liability of an indorser is equitable in nature. In the first problem, if
A, the indorser who purchased goods with the check, is not discharged
from the underlying obligation, B, the seller, can sue A and recover
payment for the goods purchased. However, in the second problem,
C, the holder, should not be able to reach B, the intermediate indorser,
on the instrument or for the underlying obligation, because C's
unexcused delay in presentment for payment has caused B to lose
valuable rights against A, the payee-indorser, who was not assumed
to be insolvent. C cannot proceed against A on the underlying obli-
gation because they are not in privity; and if A is discharged on the
instrument, C is left with the loss even though the delay in presentment
for payment has not injured Al Therefore, if the desired effect is to
have the parties liable for the underlying obligation where they are
not injured by the lathes of the holder, A should be liable to C, despite
the discharge of B on the instrument, to the extent of A's liability to
B. This could be accomplished by a change in A's contractual liability
on the instrument or, barring such a drastic revision, by an amend-
ment taking into account the equities presented by the facts of the
second hypothetical.
1110
 U.C.C. § 3-414(0.
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C. Amendment
To accomplish the desirable result suggested above, the following
amendment to section 3-802(1) (b) and the Comment thereto is
suggested:
(b) in any other case the obligation is suspended pro tanto until
the instrument is due or if it is payable on demand until its present-
ment. If the instrument is dishonored action may be maintained on
either the instrument or the obligation; DISCHARGE OF THE
UNDERLYING OBLIGOR ON THE INSTRUMENT ALSO
DISCHARGES HIM ON THE OBLIGATION TO THE EXTENT
OF HIS INJURY WHERE THE UNDERLYING OBLIGOR
HAS BEEN INJURED BY AN ACT OF THE HOLDER, BUT
THE UNDERLYING OBLIGOR IS NOT OTHERWISE DIS-
CHARGED.
COMMENT
3. The taking of a check or other negotiable instrument is a
surrender of the right to sue on the obligation until the instrument is
due, but if the instrument is not paid on due presentment the right
to sue on the obligation is "revived." Subsection (1)(b) states this
result in terms of suspension of the obligation, which is intended to
include suspension of the running of the statute of limitations. Upon
dishonor of the instrument the holder is given his option to sue
on either the instrument or the underlying obligation. Where the
original obligor has been discharged on the instrument he will be dis-
charged on the underlying obligation only to the extent he has been
injured by an act of the holder, but not otherwise.
Further, where the instrument has been transferred by more
than one indorsement and the intermediate indorser is discharged
on the instrument, an equitable assignment of the discharged in-
dorser's rights against any prior transferor shall accrue to the subse-
quent indorser. For example, A indorses to B who indorses to C, and
B is discharged, C shall be assigned B's right against A on the instru-
ment.
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